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Deconstructing Insight: EEG Correlates of Insightful
Problem Solving
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1Commission for Scientific Visualization, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria, 2Department of Neurophysiology, Center for Brain Research,
Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria, 3Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, United Kingdom
Background. Cognitive insight phenomenon lies at the core of numerous discoveries. Behavioral research indicates four
salient features of insightful problem solving: (i) mental impasse, followed by (ii) restructuring of the problem representation,
which leads to (iii) a deeper understanding of the problem, and finally culminates in (iv) an ‘‘Aha!’’ feeling of suddenness and
obviousness of the solution. However, until now no efforts have been made to investigate the neural mechanisms of these
constituent features of insight in a unified framework. Methodology/Principal Findings. In an electroencephalographic
study using verbal remote associate problems, we identified neural correlates of these four features of insightful problem
solving. Hints were provided for unsolved problems or after mental impasse. Subjective ratings of the restructuring process
and the feeling of suddenness were obtained on trial-by-trial basis. A negative correlation was found between these two
ratings indicating that sudden insightful solutions, where restructuring is a key feature, involve automatic, subconscious
recombination of information. Electroencephalogram signals were analyzed in the space6time6frequency domain with a
nonparametric cluster randomization test. First, we found strong gamma band responses at parieto-occipital regions which we
interpreted as (i) an adjustment of selective attention (leading to a mental impasse or to a correct solution depending on the
gamma band power level) and (ii) encoding and retrieval processes for the emergence of spontaneous new solutions.
Secondly, we observed an increased upper alpha band response in right temporal regions (suggesting active suppression of
weakly activated solution relevant information) for initially unsuccessful trials that after hint presentation led to a correct
solution. Finally, for trials with high restructuring, decreased alpha power (suggesting greater cortical excitation) was observed
in right prefrontal area. Conclusions/Significance. Our results provide a first account of cognitive insight by dissociating its
constituent components and potential neural correlates.
Citation: Sandku¨hler S, Bhattacharya J (2008) Deconstructing Insight: EEG Correlates of Insightful Problem Solving. PLoS ONE 3(1): e1459. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0001459
INTRODUCTION
Having a cognitive problem may be defined as the gap between
where we are now (initial state) and where we want to be (goal
state, solution), yet we do not know how to find a way to cross this
gap [1]. Often a problem is solved by proceeding along a
continuous smooth solution path. For instance, algebraic problems
usually involve a distinct but fixed number of sequential steps
between initial state and goal state which form a smooth solution
path. On the other hand, if there is a discontinuity in thinking or
solution path [2], an insight or transformative thinking is needed,
which primarily involves a mental restructuring that often leads to
a subjective ‘‘Aha!’’-an experience in which the problem solver
becomes suddenly and unpredictably aware of the solution. There
exist numerous anecdotes of such moments of insight, such as
Archimedes’ discovery of the law of buoyancy, Newton’s finding of
the law of gravitation or Kekule´’s discovery of the ring structure of
benzene [3]. Our intuitive understanding of this insight phenom-
enon or insightful problem solving seems to be quite distinct, but
psychologists have not yet agreed upon a single definition of
insight [4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. However, there are general agreements
that insightful problem solving can be characterized by four salient
features as follows:
(1) Mental impasse: There is a high probability that the problem
solver experiences an impasse in the process of solving the
problem, wherein the solver is mentally stuck on an unsuitable
construct of the problem and fails to progress further [11].
The mental impasse may be a force directing problem solving
efforts and providing resistance to finding new interpretations
of the problem that must be overcome or it may merely be a
temporal blockage of information retrieval needed for
reaching the goal [4,12]. A number of researchers have
reasoned that an excessive focus on inappropriate or
irrelevant cues hinder the problem solver to recognize the
possibly obvious solution [13,14,15,16,17]. The solution space
constrained by the problem solver can also be prejudiced if a
word or an object is used only in its most habitual usage and
association [5,8]. Due to this set effect and/or exhausting the
available options and resources, the problem solver is likely to
experience a mental impasse since she is unable to make
further progress and subsequently she gives up [18]. From an
information processing point of view, the system has reached a
limiting point at mental impasse: any new possible options or
interpretations from long-term memory are blocked from
further processing within working memory. Attentional
processes usually serve as a ‘‘general gatekeeper’’ for
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manipulating information within working memory by exerting
top-down control over which information is the most relevant
and may occupy the limited space [19]; thus, mental impasse
may be caused by an ‘‘attentional overload’’.
(2) Restructuring: This is a mechanism by which the problem
solver breaks out of mental impasse [20]. It is a transition from
an initial inappropriate and thus misleading representation of
a problem and state of not knowing how to proceed in solving
a problem to a state of knowing how to solve it [8,9,10,21].
Restructuring is made possible either by internal retrieval
processes which search long-term memory for concepts which
can be utilized to reinterpret the available knowledge in the
problem space [22] or by the availability of external cues
[15,23]. There is, however, an ongoing debate on the
underling mechanisms of restructuring involved in insight
problem solving, with different researchers proposing two
oppositional processes [24]. According to the first hypothesis,
restructuring is a controlled, conscious and attention-intense
process [22,25], and the second hypothesis suggests an
automatic and subconscious recombination where relevant
pieces of information in long-term memory are automatically
and subconsciously recombined [24,26,27,28,29]. This leaves
the problem solver unable to report what enabled him to
overcome mental impasse and successfully restructure the
problem representation [30,31].
(3) Deeper understanding: An insight is a form of deeper or more
appropriate understanding of the problem and its solution
[4,6,7,9,32]. Citing the Oxford dictionary, insight is ‘‘the
capacity to gain an accurate and intuitive understanding’’
[33]-so a true insight must lead to a correct solution [29,34].
(4) Suddenness: An insight is often perceived by the problem
solver as being spontaneous or sudden and without any
predictable forewarning [5,6,8,10,35], which is the often
reported subjective ‘‘Aha!’’ experience.
Up-to-now research on insightful problem solving has largely been
confined within the domain of behavioral psychology
[4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,21,30,32,35,36], while there are only a few
attempts to identify the underlying neural mechanisms [37,38,39,40].
However, only the post-solution [37,38,41,42] or pre-problem
presentation [40] periods were investigated, rather than the actual
process of problem solving, i.e. the pre-solution period. Thus from
these studies no conclusion can be drawn about the neural processes
underlying the solution pathway. One study [39] investigating the
pre-solution period classified insight if the problem solver reported an
‘‘Aha!’’ experience with solution. But the other key features of insight
such as restructuring and mental impasse were not addressed. The
simple fact that a problem solver experiences an ‘‘Aha!’’ tells us little
about the cognitive processes which brought about solution (and that
experience). That is, if one does not obtain a fine-grained behavior
pattern or thought progression as the problem solver solved the
problem, then one can offer rather limited information about the
cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying insight.
So, there is a paucity of knowledge about the neural correlates
of various features of cognitive insight phenomena analyzed in a
unified framework. Therefore, the main aims and objectives of this
study were to investigate the following questions related to the four
salient features characterizing insightful problem solving: (1)
Mental impasse: Can we find potential neural correlates, that
reflect an ‘‘attentional overload’’, which blocks further processing
of new information from long-term memory, and the effort to
search for available options and resources prior to mental impasse?
Further, can any neural precursor to a successful break of
functional fixedness on an unsuitable problem representation be
detected? (2) Restructuring: What is a potential neural correlate of
restructuring? Can we identify the brain responses which would
support a controlled, conscious and attention-demanding process
or rather an automatic, unconscious recombination mechanism?
(3) Deeper understanding: Are there any differences in the EEG
signals immediately prior to a correct versus a false positive ‘‘more
appropriate’’ understanding of the solution? (4) Suddenness: Can
the EEG results from Jung-Beeman and others [39] be confirmed,
who reported gamma activity at right temporal region beginning
at 300 ms before the insightful solution? Are there any further
characteristic neural signatures of the problem solver’s feeling of
suddenness and obviousness? (5) Finally, can we reveal any
relationship between the process of restructuring and ‘‘Aha!’’?
As stimuli, we used the compound remote associate problems
[43], where each problem consists of three test words (e.g., back, clip,
wall) and the subject needs to generate a solution word (paper),
which forms a valid compound word or phrase with each of the three
test words (paperback, paperclip, wallpaper). These problems have
been frequently used in studies on insight and creativity
[39,40,43,44,45]. Though they are much simpler than the classical
insight problems, they do share the key properties of these problems,
thus calling for the involvement of similar cognitive processes in
solving more complex and information-rich insight problems [45].
Further, there are also some specific advantages of using the
compound remote associate problems since they (i) can be solved
rapidly thus enabling the experimenter to record multi-trial data
from a single session, (ii) can be solved without any domain-specific
knowledge or expertise, and (iii) exist in a wide variety yet are
structurally homogeneous. Finally, one can easily create hints, that
again are all of the same structure and that may inform the subject at
a meta-level that a reinterpretation of the problem is needed [15].
Behavioral data was obtained by registering ratings of the constituent
features on a trial-by-trial basis.
The most relevant neural activities underlying complex
cognitive processes including problem solving occur at the level
of tens to hundreds of milliseconds [46,47,48]. Modern imaging
studies, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
are found to be very useful to localize brain functions, but at the
cost of low temporal resolution, which is in the range of a few
seconds [49]. Since insight and its constituent features are dynamic
and short-lived in time, EEG seems perfectly suitable to address
these questions due to its excellent millisecond range temporal
resolution and still offers reasonable spatial resolution for signals in
the cerebral cortex. Further, neuronal oscillations are aptly
represented by the EEG signals [50] and it is widely documented
that large scale brain oscillations in various frequency bands is
modulated by a diverse range of tasks in human cognition (see
[51,52,53] for reviews). Thus, in order to address our objectives in
a common framework and with systematic fashion, we conducted
a multivariate EEG experiment in which human participants
repeatedly solved verbal problems that could create a small scale
experience of insight. EEG signals were extensively analyzed in the
space6time6frequency domain with a multivariate nonparamet-
ric cluster randomization test.
RESULTS
Behavioral performance
Table 1 summarizes the behavioral performance of the participants
solving the compound remote associate tasks. It lists the median
number (with range) of trials per participant for each of the twelve
possible outcomes (see Materials & Methods). Table 2 shows the
percentages of correct and incorrect trials with and without hint. The
participants correctly solved 38.8% (mean, SD=9.6) of all
Insightful Problem Solving
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compound remote associate task trials without a hint and gave an
incorrect solution to 11.2% (SD=8.0). After hint presentation,
39.4% (SD=8.1) of all solutions were correct and 4.7% (SD=6.1) of
the hints led to an incorrect solution. 55.9% (SD=11.9) of all post-
hint trials could not be solved within the provided time limit.
The participants solved 21 out of 22 (median, range: 18–22)
control tasks, where the correct solution was presented, correctly
and missed responding within the time-limit in 0 (0–2) cases.
Further, the participants solved 10 out of 11 (5–11) control tasks,
where an incorrect solution was presented, correctly and missed
responding within the time-limit in 0 (0–5) cases.
Correlation between Rating of Suddenness and
Rating of Restructuring
For correct solutions without hint the relative frequencies of the
four levels of rating of suddenness were significantly different
(Friedman rank sum test, p,0.0001): the higher the rating of
suddenness, the more incidences we observed (Fig. 1A). The least
frequent was a suddenness rating of 0-we only observed it in 3.1%
(0–21.1) of all trials, irrespective of the rating of restructuring. For
the rating of restructuring we found an opposite significant effect
(Friedman rank sum test, p,0.001): the higher the restructuring
rating for correct solutions without hint, the fewer incidences we
monitored (Fig. 1A). For example, 23.2% (mean, SD=14.6) of all
correct solutions were sudden and involved no restructuring and
0.0% (0–41.5) of all correct solutions were sudden and involved
full restructuring. For 55.6% (SD=18.2) of the correct solutions
without hint participants reported a high feeling of suddenness
($2) and at the same time low involvement of restructuring (#1),
at least at the consciousness level. For 23.3% (SD=17.1) of the
correct solutions problem solvers gave a simultaneous high rating
of restructuring ($ 2) and suddenness ($2).
The mean Spearman rank correlation coefficient r between the
ratings of restructuring and suddenness was significantly negative
(r=20.39, one-sided t-test, t18 =25.17, p,0.0001). This negative
correlation effect was significantly attenuated (two-sided paired t-
test, t18 =27.21, p,0.0001) for correct post-hint solutions
(r=20.08, t18 =20.98, p=0.34). After hint presentation, which
should help to restructure the problem representation successfully,
the relative frequencies of the four different restructuring levels
were again significantly different (Friedman rank sum test,
p,0.0002; Fig. 1B). However, after hint presentation, we observed
higher frequencies for greater subjective restructuring ratings. The
relative frequencies of the suddenness rating were more uniformly
distributed (Friedman rank sum test, p=0.78; Fig. 1B).
Dependency of restructuring and suddenness rating
on reaction time
Next, we analyzed the interaction effect between the rating of
suddenness, the rating of restructuring and the reaction time for
correct solutions without hint. The results based on the linear mixed
effects model (see Materials & Methods) indicated that the reaction
time differed for different ratings of restructuring (F3,641 = 120.1,
p,0.0001) and suddenness (F3,49= 24.3, p,0.0001). Strong linear
and weaker quadratic effects of restructuring (p,0.0001 and p,0.08
respectively) and suddenness (p,0.0001 and p,0.08) were found.
Particularly, we observed (see Fig. 1C): the longer the required
solution time for a correct solution was, (i) the higher was the
subjective restructuring rating and (ii) the lower was the suddenness
feeling. The median reaction time for a correct solution with specific
ratings of suddenness and restructuring can be seen in Table S2.
There was no significant restructuring6suddenness interaction effect
on the reaction time (p=0.4). For correct post-hint solutions we
observed attenuated linear effects of restructuring (p,0.1) and no
linear effects for suddenness (p=0.37) on reaction time.
Mental impasse
32.0% (SD=18.3) of all compound remote associate tasks led to a
mental impasse and the mean time spent to solve the problem
before registering mental impasse was 27.9 s (SD=5.1).
EEG data
We compared four pairs of conditions in the electrode6time6fre-
quency space as follows. For each comparison, we performed paired
(two-sided) t-tests, thresholded them at p=0.01 and searched for
electrode6time6frequency clusters. Finally we assessed the signifi-
cance between conditions with a nonparametric Monte Carlo
randomization cluster test correcting for the multiple comparisons
between electrodes and time-windows (see Methods for details).
Mental impasse
One of the reasons behind a mental impasse is functional fixedness
or mental set as proposed by Gestalt psychologists. For compound
remote associate problems, this is equivalent to the situation when a
subject was fixated on generating obvious semantic associations with
test words which led to the application of inappropriate information
and to the retrieval of incorrect target words. Insight may occur after
this period of frustration in which the subject did not make any
progress. But how does the period of mental impasse differ from
similar periods of unsuccessful searching for the solution?
Table 1.Median (range) number of trials per subject that were
in each of the conditions.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Median (range)
number of trials
correct solution (without hint) 38 (24–54)
false positive or incorrect solution (without hint) 7 (2–32)
mental impasse 31 (0–57)
timeout (of the initial 45 s) 12 (0–55)
correct solution after mental impasse (post-hint) 13 (0–31)
timeout after mental impasse (post-hint) 16 (0–39)
correct solution after initial timeout (post-hint) 2 (0–20)
post-hint timeout (after initial 45 s timeout) 6 (0–34)
correct solution with no restructuring 15 (0–31)
correct solution with full restructuring 4 (0–21)
non-sudden correct solution 1 (0–8)



































Table 2. Percentage of correct and incorrect trials.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Percent of trials
without hint with hint
Correct solution 38.8 (9.6) 39.4 (8.1)
Incorrect solution 11.2 (8.0) 4.7 (6.1)
Mean (SD) percentage of compound remote associate problems for which the
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Therefore, first we compared mental impasse (N=163) with
initial timeout (N=100), and found two clusters at parieto-
occipital and occipital electrodes. One earlier strong gamma band
effect (mental impasse.timeout) from 23 to 22.5 s (40–48 Hz;
P,0.005, NS=9) and a later theta frequency band cluster (4–
8 Hz; p,0.05, P,0.04) from 22.25 to 21.5 s before mental
impasse (Fig. 2A). Secondly, we contrasted the initial processing of
hints after mental impasse that led to a successful utilization and
thus correct post-hint solution (N=89) with those that led to an
unsuccessful utilization and later timeout (N=156, Fig. 2B). From
20.2 to 0 s before hint presentation timeout trials showed ERS
and correct solutions displayed ERD (38–52 Hz; P,0.04, NS=13)
in right parieto-occipital brain regions (PO4, P8, P4, O2).
On the other hand repeating the same comparison, but for the
immediate pre- and post hint presentation period of hints that were
presented after timeout (Fig. 2C), yielded a significant cluster in the
upper alpha frequency band (10–12 Hz). More precisely, we found
for subsequent correct solutions after timeout (N=51) as compared
to a further timeout (N=96) a strong upper alpha ERS in right
temporal regions (correct solution.timeout; p,0.05; P,0.04,
NS=9) from 20.2 to 0.3 s after onset of hint presentation.
Restructuring of the Problem
Solving a problem with insight often requires restructuring of the
problem representation with a focus on the new cognitive structure
leading to the final correct solution. Restructuring is also necessary
for overcoming mental impasse. To investigate the underlying
neural correlate of restructuring, we compared correct solutions
without hint that were post-hoc rated as having involved full
restructuring (N=176) with those that were rated as having
involved no restructuring (N=116). We found a right pre-frontal
effect from 21.5 to 20.25 s before solution in the alpha frequency
band (8–12 Hz; no restructuring.full restructuring; p,0.05;
P,0.075, NS=13; Fig. 3).
Deeper understanding
Insightful problem solving involves a form of deeper or more
appropriate understanding of the problem and its solution. Thus,
an insightful solution must be a correct solution. Here, we
compared correct (N=425) with incorrect or false positive
solutions (N=83) without hint to investigate if there are any
differences between the neural processes leading to a correct
solution (and thus a true deeper understanding of the solution) and
an incorrect solution (and thus a false positive understanding of the
problem and its solution). We observed the main difference at right
parieto-occipital area in gamma band (correct.false positive; 40–
50 Hz; P,0.005, NS=17; Fig. 4) from 21.5 to 20.75 s.
Increasing the pre-specified threshold to p=0.05 revealed two
Figure 1. Relationship between restructuring of the problem and
suddenness of the solution. (A) Relative frequencies as a function of
subjective rating of restructuring and suddenness for correct solutions
without hint. The higher the rating of suddenness, the more frequent it
was. For restructuring ratings the relative frequency distribution was
reverse. The higher the rating of restructuring, the less frequent it was.
(B) As in (A), but for correct post-hint solutions. After hint presentation
the distributions of relative frequencies changed. The higher the rating
of restructuring, the higher were the relative frequencies. The four
levels of suddenness rating were equally often chosen. (C) Interaction
Plot of reaction time with ratings of suddenness and restructuring.
r
Mean reaction times, expressed in Z-scores on the ordinate, are plotted
as a function of subjective rating of restructuring for 4 different levels of
suddenness. Dotted line: gradually approached correct solution (rating
of suddenness = 0); dash-dotted line: rating= 1; dashed line: rating= 2;
solid line: solution appeared abruptly without any conscious forewarn-
ing (rating= 3). The interaction plot displays, that the longer the
required time for a correct solution was, (i) the higher was the
subjective rating of restructuring and (ii) the lower was the suddenness
feeling. Thus, the shortest reaction times were found for sudden
solutions with no restructuring and the longest reaction times were
found for non-sudden solutions with full restructuring. ’.’, ’*’, ’* *’ and
’* * *’ correspond to significance levels p,0.1, p,0.05, p,0.01 and
p,0.001 of a Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.g001
Insightful Problem Solving
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further right parieto-occipital gamma band clusters (40–50 Hz,
correct.false positive), one earlier cluster from 22.5 to 20.75 s
(P,0.002) and one later effect from 20.25 to 0.5 s after solution
response (P,0.02).
Suddenness of the Solution
Insightful solutions often occur unpredictably and abruptly thus
leading to the notion that insight is the product of a sudden
process. After verbalizing the solution at the end of each trial, the
participants indicated whether the solution emerged suddenly
inside the mind like a sudden illumination of a light-bulb (rating of
suddenness = 3 on a 4-point scale) or the solution gradually
appeared with conscious control like dimming up a light bulb
(rating of suddenness = 0; see Methods).
We compared sudden (N=302) with non-sudden solutions
(N=88) and found two significant gamma frequency band clusters
(38–44 Hz) in the parieto-occipital area. The earlier effect (from
21.5 to 21 s before the solution) was more localized at occipital
regions (PO3, Oz, O2 and PO4; P,0.003, NS=15, sudden.non-
sudden; Fig. 5A, left topography plot) and the later (from 20.75 to
0 s) cluster was primarily at right parieto-occipital region
(P,0.002, sudden.non-sudden; Fig. 5A, right topography plot).
The right hemisphere parietal cluster resembles very much (in
frequency and location) the effect that we observed for the correct
versus false positive solution comparison (Fig. 4B).
DISCUSSION
A crucial limitation of earlier research on insight using insight
problems is the explicit assumption that these problems can only
be solved by an insight. Categorizing a problem as an insight
problem (or noninsight problem) offers no concrete information
about the cognitive processes involved in solving these problems.
For example, some of these insight problems could be solved in
non-insightful ways [45] yet still with the ‘‘Aha!’’ [54]. So, the
association between problem-type and requirement of an insight is
much less rigid than usually assumed. Therefore, instead of
dwelling on the insightful nature of the problem, we have focused
here on the insightful nature of the solution and on obtaining a
fine-grained behavior or thoughts pattern by receiving the
immediate post-solution ratings of suddenness, restructuring and
confidence on trial-by-trial basis.
Mental Impasse
Several researchers argue that mental impasse is a necessary
condition for insight [8,28,29] and that the time period of struggling
with the problem without achieving a solution is as important as the
sudden realization (but also see [2] for a different view). In the
compound remote associate task the problem solver is not always
able to retrieve all known words from long term memory within the
allotted time period. It is reasonable to assume that after a few
attempts of retrieval followed by unsuccessful match, the problem
solver believes that all originally available and relevant information
has already been considered and utilized in the best possible way
[29]. This may then lead to a mental impasse.
Our results indicate a neural correlate of mental impasse in
parieto-occipital brain regions in the gamma frequency band
(Fig. 2A). This may suggest that selective attentional processes are
accountable for an excessive focus on an inappropriate problem
representation, since (i) the primary candidate brain region which
modulates selective attentional demand is the posterior parietal
lobe [55,56], and (ii) the primary oscillatory activity which gets
modulated by selective attention is the gamma frequency range
[57,58,59]. Usually the attentional load is externally manipulated
Figure 2. Significant clusters of the nonparametric cluster random-
ization tests for mental impasse and timeout. (A) Comparison of
mental impasse with timeout trials. Top left: topographical map of the
parieto-occipital gamma band cluster displaying significant differences
between the baseline-corrected spectral power of mental impasse and
timeout with P,0.005. Top right: topography of the occipital theta
band cluster for the same comparison. Bottom: Pseudo-color coded
time-frequency representation in decibel (dB) of the difference between
mental impasse and timeout averaged over electrodes PO3, Oz and
PO4. Red color indicates higher spectral power for mental impasse and
blue color indicates higher spectral power for timeout. Mental impasse
response or timeout is at t = 0 s. (B) Comparison of the immediate pre-
and post- hint presentation time period after reaching a mental
impasse between hints that led to a correct solution versus those that
led to a timeout trials. Topographical map on the left shows the right
parieto-occipital gamma band cluster, displaying significant (P,0.04)
differences. Top right: Pseudo-color coded, grand-averaged time-
frequency representation of all electrodes that comprise the significant
cluster. Bottom: grand-averaged gamma frequency event-related
synchronization (ERS) averaged for both conditions between 38 and
52 Hz and for the same electrodes as in the time-frequency
representation. The red rectangle marks the zone of significance
(p,0.01). Red color indicates higher spectral power for correct solution
trials and blue color indicates higher spectral power for timeout trials.
(C) As in (B) but comparing the immediate pre- and post- hint
presentation time period of hints after timeout that led to a correct
solution versus those that led to a further timeout. The dotted red
rectangle marks the zone of significance with p,0.05. The white
rectangles with solid and dotted lines in the grand averaged time-
frequency representation plots show the time-frequency zones of
significance with p,0.01 and p,0.05, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.g002
Insightful Problem Solving
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by the experimenter, e.g. by increasing the number of moving
targets to be attended by the subject [60]. In contrast, in the
present paradigm the external stimuli remained the same but the
internal attentional demand changed by an increasing number of
unsuccessful solution path attempts that needed to be stored in
working memory, so that they were not repeated by the problem
solver. Since working memory is limited, attention may serve as a
‘‘gatekeeper’’ for this limited space in working memory [19]. Thus
the increasing (top-down) control by attention could potentially
cause mental impasse due to an ‘‘overload’’. At right parieto-
occipital regions the gamma power was stronger just before hint
presentation for mental impasse leading to timeout than for mental
impasse leading to a correct solution (Fig. 2B). This possibly
reflects excessive selective attention which hampers finding the
solution even after the hint presentation.
Additionally, we found a theta frequency band effect (Fig. 2A),
where mental impasse elicited stronger theta frequency band
activity (4–8 Hz) over parieto-occipital regions from 22.25 to
21.5 s before moment of mental impasse. Oscillations in the theta
band are relevant for diverse cognitive tasks, typically involving
some aspects of working memory [61,62,63,64], encoding of new
information into episodic memory [65,66,67] or navigation
[68,69,70]. Kahana and others [68] demonstrated in a virtual
maze navigation task that theta oscillations were more apparent in
more complex mazes and during retrieval phase. Subsequently, it
was hypothesized that theta oscillations facilitate encoding and
retrieval in memory during a virtual maze learning task [69].
Thus, the observed theta effect is possibly associated with an
Figure 3. Significant cluster of the nonparametric cluster randomization test for correct solutions involving full restructuring versus those
involving no restructuring of problem. Left: topographical map of the right prefrontal alpha (8–10 Hz) frequency band cluster displaying significant
(P,0.075) differences between the baseline-corrected spectral power of correct solutions with full restructuring versus those with no restructuring.
Right: Grand averaged time-frequency representation of the difference between correct solutions with full restructuring and those with no
restructuring over all electrodes that comprise the significant cluster. Red color indicates higher spectral power for correct solutions with full
restructuring and blue color indicates higher spectral power for correct solutions with no restructuring. Time of solution response is at 0 s marked by
dotted red line. The white dotted rectangle marks the time-frequency zone of significance (p,0.05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.g003
Figure 4. As Figure 2A but comparing correct identifications of
solutions versus incorrect (false positive) ones. (A) Grand averaged
time-frequency representation of the difference between correct and
false positive solutions over electrodes O2, PO4, P4 and P8. (B)
Topographies of the three significant clusters at right parieto-occipital
electrodes due to the gamma frequency band (40 2 50 Hz) effect. Left:
P,0.002. Middle: P,0.005. Right: P,0.02. Red color indicates higher
spectral power for correct solutions and blue color indicates higher
spectral power for false positive solutions. Time of solution response is
at 0 s marked by red dotted vertical line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.g004
Figure 5. As Figure 2A but comparing sudden versus non-sudden
solutions. (A) Left: topography of the bilateral parieto-occipital gamma
frequency band cluster (38–44 Hz, P,0.003) displaying significant
differences between the baseline-corrected spectral power of sudden
and non-sudden solutions. Right: topographies of the right parieto-
occipital gamma band cluster (38–44 Hz, P,0.04) displaying significant
differences between the baseline-corrected spectral power of sudden
and non-sudden solutions at two different times. (B) Grand averaged
time-frequency representation of the difference between sudden and
non-sudden solutions for the strongest representant PO4 (in terms of
significance), common to both clusters. Red color indicates higher
spectral power for sudden solutions and blue color indicates higher
spectral power for non-sudden solutions. Time of solution response is
at 0 s marked by red dotted vertical line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.g005
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increased search in the memory space for possible solution words
prior to mental impasse.
As can be seen in Figure 2B,C, we found significant right
hemisphere effects at and immediately before hint presentation
that predicted successful hint utilization, irrespective of if the
problem solver experienced a mental impasse or if unsuccessful
problem solving attempts led to a timeout. These results are
consistent with previous studies that have demonstrated the critical
role of the right hemisphere in overcoming fixation and finding
non-obvious, non-dominant interpretations of words and infor-
mation in insight problems, that at first glance seem merely
remotely relevant [27,71,72]. Specifically, Fiore and Schooler [71]
showed that hints to insight problems are more effective when
presented to the left visual field (i.e. right hemisphere) than when
presented to the right visual field (i.e. left hemisphere).
Furthermore, we investigated the preparatory and immediate
post hint presentation phase of initial timeout trials (not involving a
mental impasse) and found corroborating evidence to an
interesting behavioral visual hemifield study by Beeman and
Bowden [72]. By adopting a similar compound remote associate
task paradigm but with solution related priming, they found that
the initial processing pertaining to the solution is active in both
hemispheres but fades faster in the left hemisphere because of a
fine semantic focus on a misleading interpretation of one of the test
words, yet remains persistently active in the right hemisphere due
to a broad semantic solution-relevant activation. However, this
right hemispheric activation is not likely to reach the level of
awareness because it is weak, diffuse and possibly suppressed by
stronger, yet misleading, processing in the left hemisphere.
However, what is the neuronal correlate of this sustained
suppression of the solution-related right hemisphere activation?
Can we find any difference in the neuronal processes between
solving attempts that successfully utilized the hint and those that
could not? Interestingly, we found for timeout trials that would
lead to a correct solution after hint presentation, a strong alpha
ERS (10–12 Hz; Fig. 2C). Increase in alpha activity is usually
associated with a relaxed, less active brain, because alpha power
was largest in states with eyes closed, i.e. states without focused
attention [73,74]. There is also evidence that alpha oscillations
reflect an active suppression mechanism of non-task relevant
cortical brain activity for internally driven mental processes
[53,75,76,77]. Jung-Beeman and others [39] observed increased
alpha band ( fc=9.8 Hz) activity over right posterior parietal
cortex prior to insightful solutions and associated it with
unconscious solution related processing. The strong alpha ERS
observed over right temporal area just before hint presentation
indicates an inhibition of right temporal area, which has been
associated with the integration of distantly related semantic or
lexical information [39]. However, this inhibition is only needed
when competing neuronal processes exist. We suggest that the
alpha ERS may be related to a weak, unconscious processing of
the solution in the right temporal area, consistent with previous
research showing that a solution to a verbal problem can be
weakly activated in the right hemisphere [27,44,78]. With the aid
of the hint the initially weakly activated solution related
information became intensified and reached the level of
awareness. The alpha ERS effect was not found in timeout trials
that failed to produce any solution; since no solution-relevant
information was active at the first place, nothing had to be
suppressed, and so the hint could not help to find the final solution.
Deeper Understanding
The gamma frequency band activity at parieto-occipital regions
was stronger for correct (40–50 Hz) than for false positive solutions
(Fig. 4). Interestingly functional fixedness or mental impasse was
also associated with increased gamma frequency band activity (40–
48 Hz) at right parieto-occipital regions (Fig. 2A). A hint
presentation was less successful during stronger gamma frequency
band activity (38–52 Hz) in parieto-occipital brain areas (Fig. 2B).
This may indicate that attentional processes (i.e. selective
attention) are important to produce and identify a correct solution,
but on the other hand excessive amount of selective attention
could overload the information processing capabilities and cause
impaired performance. Thus, this could explain (i) why the gamma
band power of a mental impasse is still higher in comparison to
timeout, which possibly reflects the problem solvers excessive focus
on an inappropriate problem representation and thus ‘‘attentional
overload’’, which blocks further processing of selecting target
words from verbal memory, leading to mental impasse, and (ii)
why excessive attention during mental impasse prevents that an
external hint can successfully be utilized by the problem solver.
One could thus speculate that the degree of gamma band
oscillations must remain at an optimal (i.e. sub-maximal) level to
maximize the performance.
Restructuring of the Problem
In the present study the neural correlate of conscious restructuring
(full vs. no) was mainly found in the alpha band (8–12 Hz) and in
right prefrontal brain regions (Fig. 3). This result is in line with earlier
studies. In a large patient study, Miller and Tippett [79]
demonstrated that patients with a focal right prefrontal cortex lesion
performed poorly while solving problems requiring some sort of
restructuring. The prefrontal cortex is also crucially involved in
planning in open-ended tasks [80]. Further, in a single-case study,
Goel and Grafman [81] demonstrated that a right prefrontal cortex
lesion severely impairs the capability to generate solutions for ill-
constrained problems and also the capability to restructure or break
the mental fixedness. Recent fMRI studies of healthy participants
[82,83] also implicated the right prefrontal cortex in mental
restructuring that leads to an abrupt gain of explicit knowledge
producing an insight. Altogether the present results strengthen the
critical role of right prefrontal cortex in conscious restructuring.
Suddenness of the Solution
A number of studies [35,45,84] assumed Aha!, the feeling of sudden
emergence of the solution, as a hallmark of an insight. The present
results indicate the neuronal correlate of suddenness (as shown in
Fig. 5) at parieto-occipital areas in the gamma (38–44 Hz) frequency
band from 21.5 to 21 s and from 20.75 to 0 s before solution
response. Earlier with similar compound remote associate task
paradigm, Jung-Beeman and others [39] found (i) higher gamma
band activity (center frequency ( fc) at 39 Hz) at right superior
temporal electrode T8 (and surrounding electrodes) from 2300 to
220 ms before solution and (ii) increased alpha band activity
(fc=9.8 Hz) over right parietal-occipital electrode PO8 from 21.31
to20.56 s. In the present study we also found a strong gamma effect
albeit at more posterior regions but no alpha effect. We suggest that
there are two primary reasons for these differences. Firstly, we
modified the two-alternative forced choice between ‘‘Aha!’’ and no-
‘‘Aha!’’ of Jung-Beeman and others [39] to a 4-point scale rating of
suddenness and only compared the solutions with extreme values (i.e.
rating of suddenness = 0 versus 3). Thus the results in this study
reflect a neural correlate of suddenness, whereas, Jung-Beeman and
others [39] investigated the ‘‘Aha!’’ feeling. Secondly, we have used
different data pre-processing techniques: raw power values were used
in Jung-Beeman and others [39] whereas baseline normalized values
were used in this study.
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We suggest that the observed gamma effect in the right-
hemisphere just before the response reflects retrieval processes
when the problem solver successfully retrieves a new solution
word. Gamma (and also theta) frequency band activation in right
parieto-occipital regions has earlier been associated with retrieval
processes from long-term declarative memory [85] and gamma
oscillations in general have been related to memory match and
utilization processes [86].
Relationship between Restructuring of the Problem
and Suddenness of the Solution
Another interesting issue is the relationship between the
restructuring and suddenness of the solution. Behaviorally the
problem solvers reported for more than half (55.6%) of the
solutions without hint a simultaneous high feeling of suddenness
and low involvement of restructuring (chance level lies at 25%,
Fig. 1A). Actually, the subjective ratings of restructuring and
suddenness are negatively correlated (r=20.39). On the one
hand, sudden emergence of the solution without any predictable
forewarning leading to an ‘‘Aha!’’ is often considered the
signature of an insight. On the other hand restructuring the
problem in a new way by retrieving relevant but previously
unattended information from memory which would eventually
lead to a successful solution is considered a necessary component
of insight. So how can these two key features of insight be
negatively correlated? We have two hypotheses for this intriguing
finding on post-hoc basis. The first states that the problem solver
would classify a solution to a problem as sudden if the solution
was immediately obvious after problem presentation; so restruc-
turing would not be needed and short reaction times would bias
the subjective ratings towards high feelings of suddenness. This
account was supported by the large and positive linear effects of
restructuring rating and negative linear effects of suddenness
rating on reaction time. We observed indeed high ratings of
suddenness and low involvement of restructuring for trials with
shortest reaction times (Fig. 1C). Alternatively, when a problem
solver experienced a strong feeling of suddenness, the underlying
metacognitive processes may be weak and likewise the capability
to report about the prior restructuring since the solver was not
consciously aware of the ongoing events. Metacognition is an
active monitoring process of one’s own knowledge and thoughts
which is involved in problem solving such as assessing the
difficulty of the problem, planning of strategies to approach
solution, reviewing or evaluating one’s progress, realizing an
impasse, recognizing and building new mental representations of
the problem or reconsidering one’s own thoughts. The
metacognitive process got even stronger after hint presentation,
since the problem solver was informed on a meta-level that a
more appropriate representation was needed [15]. The problem
solvers were required to quickly grasp and process the hint to
build a new mental representation and would eventually
reconsider their own strategies. Actually, the present behavioral
data did support this hypothesis. After hint presentation we
observed for 84.3% of all correct solutions a high restructuring
rating ($2; Fig. 1B), indicating a strong conscious awareness of
the ongoing restructuring processes. This explanation also
predicts that the frequency of sudden solutions with hint should
decrease because of the increased metacognitive processes that
are involved after hint presentation. Behavioral results also
supported this prediction as the ratings of restructuring and
suddenness were uncorrelated for correct post-hint solutions and
the rating of suddenness was uniformly distributed between the
four possible ratings.
In summary, both of the hypotheses on the underlying
mechanisms of restructuring may coexist and are not contradic-
tory. Therefore, we can predict that solutions which evoke a strong
feeling of suddenness involve minimal metacognitive processes and
unconscious restructuring or better an automatic, subconscious
recombination of information which stands in contrast to
conscious restructuring which is an attention-demanding process
involving executive control.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this study we characterized data by the mean and SD, if data
was normally distributed, and reported median and range
otherwise. We assessed the normality of the data by plotting the
empirical quantiles of the variable against theoretical quantiles of a
Gaussian distribution. The data did not resemble a Gaussian
distribution, if the data lay outside of the confidence envelopes
based on the standard errors of order statistics for an independent
sample from the Gaussian distribution.
Participants
Twenty one (11 female and 10 male) participants with median age
of 26.4 years (range 19.5 to 35.5 years) were paid 25–30 Euro to
take part in this experiment. All participants were native English
speakers, right-handed, and had normal or corrected to normal
vision. The median duration that they had spent in non-English
speaking countries was 2 years (range 0 to 21 years) and sixteen of
them were monolingual English speakers and five were bilingual.
Twelve participants were university students and the others had
various professions. All participants were naive to the experiment
and research area and gave written informed consent before the
start of the experiment. The study was approved by the local ethics
committee of the Medical University of Vienna, Austria.
Experimental paradigm
We used 36 compound remote associate problems of the ones used
by Bowden and Jung-Beeman [43,44] or Jung-Beeman and others
[39], modified 96 of them to mainly remove US colloquial terms
and developed 6 new problems (see Table S1 for a full list). The
initial time limit for each problem was 45 s. The participants were
asked to press the left mouse button as soon as they found the
solution that they were relatively confident with, however, without
mentally checking it. In case the subject experienced within this
initial time period a mental impasse or mental block (which we
described as ‘‘you feel that you cannot proceed’’ or ‘‘you just don’t
know what else to think of’’), she/he pressed the right mouse
button as soon as she/he reached this state. Then a clue or a hint
appeared on the monitor. Hints disclosed only the first letter (e.g.
’p - - - -’) or uncovered 60 to 75% percent of the letters-always
including the first letter (e.g. ’p - - e -’ or ’p a - - r’). The letters that
were disclosed were randomized. Following hint presentation the
subject had another 6 s to solve the problem. Hints were also
provided for trials when the participants could not solve the
problem within the allotted time of 45 s [termed as timeout trials].
After receiving solution, we first asked the subject to verbalize
the solution and then to provide the following subjective ratings:
(1) Rating of Restructuring: Restructuring is a type of event in
which one comes to see the problem in a new way. We explained
to the subject the following criteria for full restructuring of the
problem (rating = 3) [20,87]: (i) ‘‘Elaboration’’: one finds a new
function of use for a word; (ii) ‘‘Re-encoding’’: one rejects the use
of a word and uses another meaning or application of that word
which was not considered previously; (iii) ‘‘Constraint Relaxation’’:
one changes his/her problem representation. The subject rated
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the extent of restructuring involved in generating the solution on a
scale from 0 (no restructuring) to 3 (full restructuring). (2) Rating of
Suddenness: The participants were then asked to give a rating of
suddenness of the emergence of the solutions on a scale from 0 (the
solution appeared gradually as like ‘‘slowly dimming up a light
bulb’’) to 3 (the solution appeared abruptly without any conscious
forewarning as like the ‘‘flashing of a light bulb’’). (3) Rating of
Confidence: Finally, we asked how confident the subject was of the
solution. The rating of confidence M{0, 1, 2, 3} pictures the
number of words that the subject is confident with that match with
the solution word. In this study trials were only considered when
the confidence rating was greater than or equal to 2, thus
minimizing the trials that involved significant guessing.
As a control task, compound remote associate problems were
presented together with a possible single solution word. The
subject had to decide the correctness of the given solution. The
time limit for this task was 7 s.
To minimize the required eye movements during each trial (i)
participants had to fixate on a fixation cross in the middle of a
monitor (Sony Multiscan G520) before initiating a trial by a left
mouse button press, and (ii) compound remote associate problems
were compactly presented in the middle of the screen with text size
20 and a 24 point line spacing. Trials began with the presentation of
three dummy words (‘compound’, ‘compound’, ‘compound’) in
place of the actual problem words. This initial pre-trial interval was
randomly varied between 1 and 2.5 s. The order of the test words
within each problem and the order of the problems within each
experiment were randomized, as was the type of problem. Thus the
same problem could be a usual compound remote associate task for
one subject and a control task for another subject.
Prior to recording, the participants were familiarized with the
whole procedure by 5 practice trials. In the actual experiment, the
participants solved 100 compound remote associate problems and
33 control trials (of which 22 presented the correct solution word
and 11 an incorrect solution). Breaks were provided if necessary
and special attention was paid to monitor mental fatigue of the
participants. The entire recording was limited to 2 hours for each
subject including breaks.
Behavioral data analysis
Behavioral data was obtained by registering performance and
ratings of the constituent features of insightful problem solving on
a trial-by-trial basis. Two participants were excluded from further
data analysis, because they solved only 50% and 54.5% of all
control trials, where the incorrect solution should have been
detected and rejected. Thus their data was not trustworthy.
Additionally, one particular subject showed a peculiar profile of
distribution of response times for mental impasse. This was mainly
because this subject pressed the button indicating mental impasse
too early (median time 17.3 (9.4–32.9) s) and too often (60% of its
trials led to a mental impasse). Thus we excluded two thirds of the
shortest mental impasse trials, because short response times and
the great mental impasse frequency conjectured unseriousness or
laziness of the subject in trying to think of all options to solve the
problem. Furthermore, 10% of the shortest mental impasse trials
of all participants were excluded-resulting in a cutoff of t = 19.3 s
(also for the behavioral data analysis). Statistical testing of possible
restructuring and suddenness interaction effects on reaction time,
i.e. time to generate solution, was performed by utilizing a linear
mixed-effects model [function lme() from package nlme in R] which
was estimated by Restricted (or Residual) Maximum Likelihood
[88,89,90,91]. We implemented the model as a repeated-measure
block design with the rating of restructuring and of suddenness as
the main within-subject effects and the random effect was due to
the subject. We achieved independent and nearly normally
distributed residuals by log-transforming the dependent variable,
reaction time.
To plot the linear effects (Fig. 1C) and thus be able to visually
compare the effects between participants, we transformed for each
subject the reaction time data, ti, i=1, ..., N, to standardized z-
scores, Zi, i=1, ..., N where N is the number of trials. Therefore we
used a robust version of the z-score [92,93] where the mean and
standard deviation (SD) estimates were replaced by the median and
the Median Absolute Deviation from the median (MAD) with
asymptotically normal consistency (i.e. E[MAD({ti}
N
i=1)] =s for ti





, j~1, . . . ,N
EEG measurement
Continuous EEG signals were recorded with a Bio-Semi
ActiveTwo measurement system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The
Netherlans) by using Ag-AgCl active electrodes. A standard
BioSemi head cap which has 32 electrode holders arranged
according to the extended International 10–20 System [94] was
used. Additionally, horizontal and vertical electrooculogram
signals were recorded to monitor blinks and eye movements. All
signals were digitized with 24 bit resolution and DC-400 Hz
bandwidth and sampled at a sample rate of 2048 Hz.
EEG data analysis
We performed data preprocessing including artifact correction and
time-frequency analysis using complex demodulation [95,96] with
BESA software (MEGIS Software GmbH, Gra¨felfing, Germany).
EEG signals were average referenced and divided into the
following segments: (i) 2.5 s before to 500 ms after the response
button press indicating solution, (ii) 3 s time period before the
moment of impasse or the point of timeout during the initial 45 s
of problem solving and (iii) 200 ms before to 1 s after hint-onset.
We chose the last 500 ms of the pre-trial interval as the baseline.
Blink artifacts were removed by the two-step surrogate multiple
source eye correction method [97,98] which is a spatial filter
approach. In the first step we estimated the prototype of blink
topography. We improved the signal-to-noise ratio of the eye
artifact pattern search with a 0.5 Hz forward high-pass filter and a
zero-phase 8 Hz low-pass filter. Spatial topographies describing
the blink artifacts were searched and averaged automatically. The
median variance of the first principal component was 99.4%
(range 98.2–99.9%). In the second step, brain activity was
estimated with a fixed dipole source configuration (4 temporal, 3
parietal, 4 frontal, 3 central and 1 occipital source) while
considering the predefined blink artifact topography. We excluded
individual trials that still contained eye movements, muscle
artifacts or dropped out channels according to the following
criteria: (i) maximum amplitudes within the predefined trial
segments of interest were higher than 100 mV, (ii) the maximum
amplitude difference between two neighboring samples was more
than 75 mV or (iii) the maximum signal amplitude was lower than
0.03 mV. Artifact free signals were high pass filtered with 0.2 Hz
zero-phase filter (6 dB/octave); power-line noise was eliminated by
a 50 Hz notch filter with a 2 Hz bandwidth.
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Depending on the correctness of solution, occurrence of mental
impasse, utilization of hint and the participants own rating of
suddenness and/or restructuring, we categorized and segmented the
recorded trials into twelve conditions as follows: (i) correct solution
(without hint), (ii) false positive or incorrect solution (without hint),
(iii) mental impasse, (iv) timeout (of the initial 45 s), (v) correct
solution after mental impasse (post-hint), (vi) timeout after mental
impasse (post-hint), (vii) correct solution after initial timeout (post-
hint), (viii) post-hint timeout (after initial 45 s timeout), (ix) correct
solution with no restructuring (rating of restructuring=0), (x) correct
solution with full restructuring (rating of restructuring=3), (xi) non-
sudden correct solution (rating of suddenness= 0) and (xii) sudden
correct solution (rating of suddenness = 3). The twelve categories
must not be exclusionary. A problem that is solved correctly without
hint, with no restructuring and with a high rating of suddenness
would be in categories (i), (ix) and (xii).
For the time-frequency analysis, single trial data corresponding
to each condition was transformed into the time-frequency domain
using complex demodulation. We chose a time-frequency
sampling of 2 Hz/25 ms in the frequency range 4–80 Hz, which
corresponded to a full power width at half maximum of 2 ?
2.83 Hz and 2 ? 39.4 ms. We quantified the event-related changes
in spectral power (in %) as follows (Pfurtscheller & Silva, 1999):
S% t,fð Þ~P t,fð Þ{B fð Þ
B fð Þ |100
where P(t, f ) is the arithmetic mean of the spectral power of all
trials for a specific time t and frequency f and B( f ) is the mean
spectral power at frequency f over the 500 ms long baseline for all
trials. Thus S%(t, f) is the percentage change of task related power
with respect to the baseline power at a specific frequency [99].
These changes have been called event-related synchronization
(ERS) for higher task-related power or event-related desynchro-
nization (ERD) for lower task-related power as compared to the
baseline; ERS and ERD are due to an increase or a decrease,
respectively, in local synchrony of the underlying neuronal
populations oscillating in the same frequency band. For each
condition, only those participants were included that produced at
least two artifact-free trials. We calculated S%(t, f) for each
condition and subject and then transformed ERS values in
percentage to a ratio expressed in decibel by









~10 log10 P t,fð Þ½ {10 log10 B fð Þ½ :
By this instantaneous differencing, the distribution of ERS values
was rendered approximately Gaussian, which made the subse-
quent parametric t-tests on log-transformed differences valid and
exact [100]. The subsequent statistical analysis was performed
with mean SdB values for time-windows spanning 200 ms for the
time-locked (to hint presentation) comparisons and 500 ms for all
other comparisons and two successive windows overlapped by half
of the window length. Time-frequency data was also averaged
within standard frequency bands as follows: theta (4–8 Hz), alpha1
(8–10 Hz), alpha2 (10–12 Hz), beta1 (12–20 Hz) and beta2 (20–
30 Hz). For gamma band, the frequency boundaries were chosen
on the basis of visual inspection of the averaged ERS values [85].
To avoid the multiple comparisons problem and to be able to
effectively control the type I error rate, we used a nonparametric
cluster randomization test [85,101,102] for establishing the
significance of the time-frequency power difference between any
two compared conditions. For each time, frequency and electrode
combination, paired two-sided t-test statistics were calculated. We
only considered significant values in the subsequent analysis that
were smaller than a pre-specified threshold of p=0.01 (two-sided),
or p=0.05 if mentioned. Next we searched for both positive and
negative t-statistic clusters in time, frequency and electrode space,
where we considered electrodes with a distance of less than 7 cm
as neighbors (yielding on average 6.8 neighbors per channel). This
approach seems justified since neighboring electrodes record from
overlapping neural sources. We assumed that a robust cluster
should encompass at least 4 neighboring channels. In case the
cluster was localized at the edge of the scalp, 3 neighboring
channels within one cluster were presumed as sufficient. For each
cluster we calculated the sum of the t-test statistics as the test
statistic. Subsequently, Monte Carlo randomization was used to
obtain a distribution function of the test statistics. Thus, the entire
analysis (t-tests, thresholding, finding clusters, computing the test
statistic) was repeated for each randomization, and maximum and
minimum t-sum values were repetitively saved. The total number
of randomizations was 1900, with which we accomplished that the
coefficient of variation of the test statistic varied less than 10%
[103]. If this number exceeded the maximum possible number of
permutations an exact permutation test was conducted (for
NS#10). The significance P of an original cluster was estimated
according to the proportion of the randomization null distribution
exceeding the observed maximum/minimum t-sum test-statistics.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Table S1 List of used compound remote associate problems and
their solvability in the study. The data is presented in descending
order according to the percentage of subjects solving the
compound remote associate problem within the 45-s time limit.
Words in bold correspond to compound remote associate problem
changes compared to the initially published list by Bowden and
Jung-Beeman [43].
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.s001 (0.27MBRTF)
Table S2 Percentage of correct and incorrect trials. Mean (SD)
percentage of compound remote associate problems for which the
subjects gave correct or incorrect (false positive) solutions without
and with hint.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001459.s002 (0.02MBRTF)
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